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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PRESUMPTION-EVIDENCE TO REBuT-DIsPOSITION.
There has been much confusion in the cases as to the nature
of a presumption. This condition has come about because of the
use of the word to connote a presumption of law and one of fact.'
Historical reasons have brought about this misuse.2 The presump-
tion of law, or, as it is put, the only real presumption,3 is a rule of
law that courts and Judges shall draw a particular inference from
a particular fact or evidence, unless and until the truth of such in-
ference is disproved.4 It places the burden of going forward with
proof on the party against whom the presumption has been raised.5
Concerning the presumption of fact, or, as it has been called, the
pseudo-presumption, 6 it merely allows the Court to draw an infer-
ence from certain facts but it is not bound so to do.7
Because of such usage the real presumption has been given
an evidentiary weight which it does not possess.8 Mr. Thayer says
that a presumption of law amounts to a substantive rule of law
and has no place in the law of evidence.9 He defines evidence as
"any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise
than by reasoning, as the basis of inference in ascertaining some
other matter of fact.10 The law of evidence has to do with the
furnishing of this matter of fact." " It sets forth 1. the manner of
presenting evidence; 2. the qualifications and privileges of witnesses,
and mode of examining them; and 3. what. classes of things shall
not be received.12 A presumption, though, was brought into the law
because when evidence, as to certain facts, was introduced it was
found by the general experience of mankind that a certain conclu-
sion could be drawn.13 And this conclusion cannot be held to have
evidentiary value.' 4
But there are cases where the opposite conclusion has been
stated. In a New York case,' where the question was as to the
receipt of a letter, it was stated that the presumption of receipt is
rebuttable, "and it is for the jury to say, after considering presump-
tion and proof given by person addressed, whether letter had been
'5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 451.
Thayer, Presumption in the Law of Evidence (1889) 3 H~Av. L. REV. 141.
'Supra note 1.
STEPHEN, INTRODUCTION TO DIGEST OF EVIDENCE, art. I.
'Supra note 2.
'Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 17 Pac. (2d) 651 (1933).
'Supra note 1, at 453.8Supra note 2.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
n Ibid.
u Ibid.
1Ibid.
' G. S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 129 Ala. 238, 29 So. 673 (1901).
'McCurdy v. Wegner, 129 Misc. 230, 220 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1927).
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received." Elsewhere it was held that the party in whose favor a
presumption stands is entitled to its benefit as evidence.16 Likewise
Mr. Richardson says that the trial Court or jury is entitled to weigh
the presumption against the evidence and decide the issue either
way as a finding of fact.17
Still the greater weight of authority seems to be the other way.
Presumptions are rules of law; they govern a disposition of the
case by a trial Judge; they are not evidence to be given effect by
the trial jury.'8  In another case concerning the presumption of
receipt of a letter, the defendant denied receipt of it, and the lower
court ruled that her positive denial overcame presumption.' 9 Judge
Hatch, writing for the Appellate Division, declared that this was
error because the person who made the denial was an interested
party and it was within the province of the jury to reject her state-
ment.20 It would seem to follow from such reasoning that if state-
ment was not interested there would be no question for the jury.
Now the question is presented as to what kind, and how much,
evidence is necessary to overcome a presumption: Mr. Wigmore
says that some evidence will do away with it.2' In a case where
there was a presumption as to the negligence of defendant railroad,
the United States Supreme Court held that "the only legal effect
of this inference is to cast upon the railroad the burden of produc-
ing some evidence to the contrary. When that is done the inference
is at an end, and the question of negligence is one for the jury
upon all of the evidence." 22
But the statement that some evidence is necessary prompts one
to ask what must that some evidence be. In an able and thorough
opinion this point was discussed by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.2
Here we had a situation where a statute raised a presumption of
negligence if certain facts were shown. The defendant contended
that some evidence was enough to dissipate presumption. The Court
admitted that it was true that a prima; fade case, or a presumption,
disappears in the face of evidence. But what evidence? The Court
answered the query by stating that the evidence must be substantial
and credible.24  A presumption- cannot stand against unimpeached
and positive evidence. 25
" Nichols v. Baltimore R. R. Co., 33 Ind. 229, 70 N. E. 183 (1904).
' RICHARDsON, EVIDENCE (1931) §28.
" Hogan v. O'Brien, 212 App. Div. 193, 208 N. Y. Supp. 477 (3rd Dept.
1925).
' Moran v. Abbott, 26 App. Div. 570, 50 N. Y. Supp. 337 (2d Dept. 1898).
mIbid.
I Supra note 1, at 452.
2'Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136(1910).
'Supra note 6.24Ibid.
=Moore v. Wooten, 280 S. W. 742 (C. A. of Tex. 1926).
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In the case of Frankel v. Traveler's Insurance Co.26 the plain-
tiff invoked the rule that there is a presumption that death is due
to accident and not to suicide. Below the Judge had refused to
submit the case to the jury and this was claimed by the appellant
to be error. The Court says,
"But plaintiff had the burden of proving the fact neces-
sary to establish the liability of the insurance company, and
the legal presumption that might aid her could be of value
only under circumstances leaving the cause of death in doubt.
The presumption is overcome by evidence that death was
self-inflicted, or facts inconsistent with any reasonable hypo-
thesis of death by accident, or circumstances and conditions
leaving no room for any reasonable hypothesis than suicide." 27
Evidence was substantial and credible and it was held, that the Judge
was not in error in refusing to submit case to jury. For if they
found the other way the verdict could not be allowed to stand, and
the trial Court would have been required to set it aside, in the ex-
ercise of sound judicial discretion. Presumptions must give way in
face of clear, distinct and convincing proof. 28
In New York it has been repeatedly stated that when substan-
tial evidence to the contrary is introduced the presumption disap-
pears and ceases to be a legal factor in the case. 29 In Rose v. Balfe,30
plaintiff rested on the presumption of control growing out of own-
ership of a car. Held, presumption continues until there is substan-
tial evidence to the contrary.31 The Court in Potts v. Pardee 32
declared that:
"Presumption growing out of a prima facie case, remains
only so long as there is no substantial evidence to the con-
trary. When that is offered the presumption disappears, and
unless met by further proof there is nothing to justify a
finding based solely thereon."
And in the latest case in New York on the subject, St. Andrassy
v. Mooney,33 the plaintiff rested on the presumption that defendant's
automobile was being lawfully operated by the driver. The ques-
tion of negligence was not disputed but defendant claimed that the
-51 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
2 Ibid.
'Note, 10 R. C. L. 868.
'Kennell v. Rider, 225 App. Div. 391, 233 N. Y. Supp. 252 (3rd Dept.1929).19223 N. Y. 481, 119 N. E. 842 (1918).
"Carroll v. Kinich, 218 N. Y. 435, 116 N. E. 507 (1916) ; Chaika v. Van-
denberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929).
"220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917).
"262 N. Y. 368, 186 N. E. 867 (1933).
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evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of permission.
Defendant and his wife testified that the car-was being used with-
out their permission and therefore it was unlawfully in operation.
This testimony was not contradicted. The chauffeur corroborated
this testimony. Surrounding this evidence were circumstances which
tended to bolster up defendant's statement, i.e., the car was being
used after hours and also contained a party of the chauffeur's
friends. The trial Judge submitted the testimony to the jury to
decide upon its credibility, and they found for plaintiff.
On appeal the respondent maintained that this evidence was in-
terested and discredited. But the Court of Appeals held that even
though interested the fact still remained that it was not discredited.
The only conclusion, said the Court, that could be reasonably drawn
from the uncontradicted evidence was that the chauffeur at the time
of the accident operated the car unlawfully and without permission.
The judgment was accordingly reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Summing up, the rule may be stated that a presumption is
overcome by substantial and credible evidence. 34 And when a party
does not come forward to discredit such evidence it is apparent that
there is no question for the jury.
JOHN BENNETT.
EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT IN FORM OF ASSIGNMENT.
By the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1897,1
New York aligned itself with its sister states in the interests of
commerce and for the purpose of bringing into the law of commercial
paper a uniformity which heretofore had been lacking. In the main,
the statute codified the common law, although some of the old rules
were changed. It might be supposed that with a common basis for
adjudication, the courts of the several states would find it easy to
agree on basic principles. But often a question of construction of the
same section of the statute will arise in two separate states and be
answered differently. It is possible, therefore, for states with the
same Negotiable Instruments Law to adopt different constructions of
the statute.
"In criminal cases the rule is different. Presumption of sanity and evi-
dence are all to be considered by the jury. Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159
(1878); People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903). "This presump-
tion [of innocence] on the one hand, supplemented by any other evidence he
may adduce, and the evidence against him on the other, constitute the elements
from which the legal conclusion of his guilt or innocence can be drawn." It
must be charged to the jury. Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1894).
'N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612; Cons. Laws 1909, c. 38.
